Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1982

Sharon M. Davis v. Charles Francis Davis : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Henry S. Nygaard; Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent; Attorney for Appellant;
Paul H> Liapis; Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Davis v. Davis, No. 18077 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2691

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------00000---------SHARON M. DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 18077

v.
CHARLES FRANCIS DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

----------00000----------

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
AN APPEAL FROM A DECREE OF DIVORCE AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE G. HAL TAYLOR, PRESIDING
PAUL H. LIAPIS
KENT M.. KASTING
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
1000 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-6996
Attorneys for Respondent,
Sharon Mae Davis
HENRY S. NYGAARD
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
1100 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-2506

'· --'
~!..%;.

~

u

u

't
:"I.,,,

..t.J
E il

Attorneys for Appellant,
Charles Francis Davis
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----------00000---------SHARON M. DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 18077

v.
CHARLES FRANCIS DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

----------00000----------

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
AN APPEAL FROM A DECREE OF DIVORCE AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE G. HAL TAYLOR, PRESIDING
PAUL H. LIAPIS
KENT M. KASTING
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
1000 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-6996
Attorneys for Respondent,
Sharon Mae Davis
HENRY S. NYGAARD
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
1100 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-2506
Attorneys for Appellant,
Charles Francis Davis
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
NATURE OF THE CASE . • . . . . .

. 1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT . .

• • • 2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . .

. 3

ARGUMENT.

•

POINT I.

•

•

.

• 6

. 6

THE DECISION OF A TRIAL COURT
IN A DIVORCE ACTION SHOULD
NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THERE
IS A CLEAR SHOWING OF A MISAPPLICATION OF LAW OR AN ABUSE
OF DISCRETION RESULTING IN A
SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR SERIOUS
INEQUITY.
POINT II . .

•

. .

•

•

•

• 8

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF
ALIMONY WAS PROPER GIVEN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PARTIES.
PO INT I I I . . .

. .

.

. . . .

. . • . . . . . 11

THE REAL PROPERTY INTERESTS
OF THE PARTIES WERE PROPERLY
AND FAIRLY DISTRIBUTED.
CONCLUSION.

.

. .

. .

.

.

. . .

• . . • . . . .

. 13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AUTHORITIES CITED
CASE

PAGE

English v. English, 565 P.2d 409
(Utah, 19 7 7) . . . . . . .

•

•

•

•

•

• •

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218
(Utah, 1980) . . . . .
Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144

•7

. 10

(Utah, 1979).

.

.9

Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1977).

. 13

Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697

.

.7

.

.7

(Utah, 1974).

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 376 P.2d 547
(Utah, 19 6 3) . . . . . . . .
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----------00000----------

SHARON M. DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 18077

v.
CHARLES FRANCIS DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

----------00000----------

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case.

Respondent filed a Complaint

seeking, among other things, an award of the parties'
residence; one-half of the value of certain New Mexico
property; alimony; an order requiring the Respondent to assume
all debts of the marriage with the exception of the first
mortgage on the residence; and attorney's fees.

Appellant

answered and counterclaimed seeking, .among other things,
one-half of the equity in the home, an award of the New Mexico
property, an equitable distribution of the personal property
and an order requiring each party to bear their own debts,
obligations and attorney's fees.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the Honorable G. Hal Taylor and,
after the evidence was received, the Court granted Respondent a
Decree of Divorce.

The Court took the issues of support and

the distribution of the marital property under advisement and
- each of the parties submitted Briefs in support of their
respective positions.

The Trial Court then awarded Respondent

the use of the marital residence subject to an $11,500.00 lien
in favor of the Appellant with Respondent to pay the first
and second mortgage payments.

The Court ordered the New Mexico

property sold and the net proceeds divided between the parties,
one-third to Respondent and two-thirds to Appellant.

The Court

ordered Appellant to pay to the Respondent $420.00 per month
alimony to continue until the second mortgage on the residence
had been paid in full.

The Court distributed the debts and

personal property of the parties and awarded Respondent
$1,000.00 attorney's fees.

Appellant objected to the proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Court heard
argument on those objections.

It modified the Decree of

Divorce clarifying certain conditions which would cause the
Appellant's lien on the residence to become due; affirmed its
Decision calling for the sale of the New Mexico property; and,
reaffirmed all remaining particulars of the Memorandum
Decision.

No Motion for New Trial was filed.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the Decree of Divorce,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order on
Defendant's Objections in all particulars and an award of her
costs incurred in connection with this Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has made certain omissions in his Statement of
Facts and Respondent feels it is necessary to more accurately
set forth the facts as found by the Trial Court and as are
supported by the record.
The parties were married on March 5, 1974 and separated on
May 15, 1980.

(R-93)

Respondent gave up a $150.00 per month

alimony award from a previous divorce when she married
Appellant.

(R-140)

Throughout the six-year marriage,

Appellant worked as a truck driver and, at the time of trial,
was grossing approximately $27,000.00 per year.

(R-163)

Respondent was working at the time of the marriage, but quit at
the request of Appellant.

(R-156)

However, she did work

during the marriage (R-156) and, at the time of trial, was
earning $687.38 net per month.

(R-95)

During the marriage,

the parties worked together and jointly contributed money, time
and effort to the maintenance of the household.

(R-130, 146).

Respondent brought certain furniture into the marriage
which Appellant directed be disposed of because of its
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connection with Respondent's former husband.

(R-203)

had a 1974 Gran Torino which Appellant sold.

The proceeds were

then used for family purposes.

(R-130)

She also

Appellant also brought

some furniture into the marriage and a 1967 Oldsmobile which
Respondent was allowed to use.
Respondent also brought a personal residence into the
marriage subject to an $18,210.00 mortgage.
parties used this home during the marriage.

(R-22, 117)

The

The monthly

payment on the first mortgage is $195.00 and presently has a
balance of $14,421.90.

(R-94, 95)

Shortly before separation,

a second mortgage was taken on the home and its balance at the
time of trial was $15,876.27 with monthly payments of $345.00.
(R-94-95)

Appellant had made the monthly second mortgage

payments from the time the parties separated to the time of
trial.

(R-141, 164)

There was a conflict in the testimony of

the parties as to how much additional money was spent for
improvements on the home.

Appellant stated he spent over

$40,000.00 in improvements on the house.

(R-198, L 14-22)

The

figures and references to the record appearing on pages 3 and 4
of Appellant's. Brief are but paraphrases of Appellant's
testimony and there was no documentation which would show that
these monies went for improvements in the home.

In addition,

Appellant's overall credibility was impeached during cross
examination.

(R-184-185)
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Appellant brought four unimproved lots into the marriage.
The parties made payments on these lots from their joint
accounts until they were paid for in 1978.

(R-125).

No

independent testimony was presented as to the value of these
lots, however, Appellant listed them for sale during the
marriage for a total purchase price of $29,000.00.

(R-156)

Appellant further testified that many of the debts in
issue were incurred by him subsequent to the parties'
separation and he agreed to pay these debts.

(R-172)

The Court had earlier entered an Order of Temporary
Support in Respondent's favor in the amount of $450.00 per
month.

(R-34)

Appellant had partially complied with this

Order by making the second mortgage payments of $345.00 per
month for 9 months.
At the close of the evidence, the Trial Court granted
Respondent a Decree of Divorce and asked that each side submit
Memoranda setting forth what each felt to be a reasonable
distribution of assets and liabilities.

(R-209)

During the course of the trial, and in his Memorandum, the
Appellant and his counsel suggested to the Court that
Respondent.'s residence not be sold and that Appellant pay the
second mortgage payments in lieu of alimony and that Appellant
share in the equity of the home when it was ultimately sold.
(R-82, 165, 167, 211)

Respondent asked only for alimony until
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the second mortgage was paid.

(R-158)

Respondent also requested an award of attorney's fees of
$1,530.00 plus $148.00 in costs.

(R-159)

The Trial Court

ordered Appellant to pay $1,000.00 towards those fees.

(R-103)

After the Court had entered its Memorandum Decision,
Appellant objected to the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

(R-85-86)

He did not challenge the

Court's alimony award, or the base amount of Appellant's lien
on the residence, but only the conditions as to when
that lien would become due.

(R-85)

The Trial Court heard the

objections and modified certain portions of its Decision
(R-88-92) as requested by Appellant.
No Motion for New Trial was made and the final Decree of
Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
approved by Appellant's counsel.

(R-99, 104)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF A TRIAL COURT
IN A DIVORCE ACTION SHOULD
NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THERE IS
A CLEAR SHOWING OF A MISAPPLitATION
OF LAW OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
RESULTING IN A SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR
SERIOUS INEQUITY.
Appellant contends that the Trial Court erred in its award
of alimony and inequitably distributed the marital assets and,
consequently, abused the wide discretion afforded a Trial Court
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in making such property distributions and support awards.

The

evidence presented to the Trial Court clearly shows that this
is just not the case.
In order to prevail on this Appeal, Appellant is required
to show that the Trial Court, in making its support award or
distribution of property, misunderstood or misapplied the law;
entered Findings not supported by the evidence; or caused a
serious inequity so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah, 1977).

As was

clearly stated in Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974):
Although it is both the duty and prerogative of this
Court in a case of equity to review the facts as well as
the law, Article VIII, § 9, Constitution of Utah, the
Trial Judge has considerable latitude of discretion in
adjusting the financial and property interests in a
divorce case. The actions of the Trial Court are indulged
with the presumption of validity, and the burden is upon
Appellant to prove such a serious inequity as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion.
(Footnote)
There is no
fixed formula for the division of property; § 30-3-5
U.C.A. 1953, provides that when a decree of divorce is
made, "the Court may make such orders in relation to
property as may be equitable.
(Footnote)
Id. at 700.
Appellant's burden is not an easy one and the record does
not show in any way an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court.
As was stated in Sorenson v. Sorenson, 376 P.2d 547 (Utah,
1963) :
Unless there is manifest injustice and inequity or a
clear abuse of discretion, the Court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the Trial Court.
Id. at 548.
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The Memorandum Decision (R-66) and the Order on
Defendant's Objection (R-90) reveal that the Trial Court
carefully considered all of the evidence before it, reviewed
the suggested positions regarding support and property and
reached a solution which would not unjustly burden either
party.

In so doing, it fashioned a remedy which provided

Respondent with sufficient sums to make certain she could keep
the house she brought into the marriage; gave Appellant a
substantial increasing interest in that home; and made certain
that the parties' interest in the New Mexico property would be
•,

;,,

fairly determined and distributed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY
AWARD WAS PROPER GIVEN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PARTIES
In making its award of alimony, the Trial Court had before
it the following facts:

This was a six-year marriage.

(R-93)

Respondent had been receiving $150.00 per month alimony when
she married Appellant.

(R-141)

At the request of Appellant,

Respondent worked only a short time during the marriage.
(R-156)

At the time of trial, Respondent was employed and
~

netting $687.00 per month and Appellant was netting $1,451.67
per month.

(R-95)

A second mortgage on the Respondent's home

had been taken out just prior to separation with monthly
payments of $345.00.

(R-94-95)

Appellant had been making that
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second payment for the nine months the parties had been
separated; Respondent had requested an award of alimony until
the second mortgage was paid (R-158); and, Appellant, during
the trial, suggested on several occasions that he be allowed to
make the second mortgage payment in lieu of alimony.

(R-82,

167 and 211)
With these facts before it, the Trial Court, realizing it
would be unfair to require Respondent and her three children to
find a new residence with much higher monthly payments,
considered the disparity in earnings of the parties and ordered
Appellant to pay $420.00 per month alimony until the second
mortgage was paid.

In so doing, it followed the guidelines set

forth in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1979):
The purpose of alimony is to provide post-marital
support; it is intended neither as a penalty imposed on
the husband nor as a reward to the wife.
Its function is
to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at
the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and
to prevent her from becoming a public charge.
Important
criteria in determining a reasonable award for support and
maintenance are the financial conditions and needs of the
wife, considering her station in life; her ability to
produce sufficient income for herself; and the ability of
the husband to provide support.
Id. at 147 (Emphasis
added, footnote omitted.)
In this case, the Trial Court recognized the needs of
Respondent in having sums sufficient to pay the second mortgage
so that she could continue as best as possible to enjoy at
least the standard of living she had before and during her
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marriage to Appellant.

It further noted that Appellant earned

more than twice as much as Respondent, but also that, given the
circumstances, his obligation to pay alimony .should not
continue indefinitely.
Appellant contends in Point I of his Brief that if he is
required to make the second mortgage payment as a part of his
alimony obligation, he should receive a reimbursement for the
amounts which reduce the second mortgage when the home is
ultimately sold.

In essence, Appellant is arguing for the

concept of "reimbursable alimony."
In so doing, Appellant has confused and merged the issues
of alimony and property distribution.

Contrary to Appellant's

claim, an alimony award is separate and distinct from a
property settlement.

As was stated in Fletcher v. Fletcher,

615 P.2d 1218 (Utah, 1980):
. There is a distinction between the division of
assets accumulated during marriage, which are distributed
upon an equitable basis, and the post-marital duty of
support and maintenance . . .
Id. at 1223.
The Trial Court recognized that distinction and ordered a
$420.00 per month alimony payment, the same to end when the
second mortgage has been paid.

That payment is to be made

directly to Respondent as alimony not as Appellant's
contribution towards the second mortgage.

This is further

supported by the fact that the Court required the Respondent to
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assume and pay the second mortgage payment.

(R-101)

The Court

then dealt with the property distribution issue and allowed
Appellant an $11,500.00 lien in the property, plus one-half of
any increases in the value of the property due to inflation.
Clearly, then the amount and duration of the alimony award and
_the determination of Appellant's equity interest in the home
are separate and distinct from one another and not the least
bit unreasonable, especially in light of the fact that
Appellant himself had suggested his amenability to such an
approach numerous times during the proceedings.

(R-82, 167,

211)
POINT III
THE REAL PROPERTY INTERESTS OF
THE PARTIES WERE PROPERLY
AND FAIRLY DISTRIBUTED
It is undisputed that both parties brought property into
the marriage.

Respondent - a home with a mortgage on it, and

Appellant - 4 real estate lots subject to an unpaid contract
balance~

During the marriage, each of the parties worked

together and jointly contributed their time, efforts, and money
in an attempt to make a successful marriage.
148 and 156)
action.

(R-125,

l~O,

146;

That attempt failed as is evidenced by this

However, over the course of the marriage, the values

of this property changed because of payments made, mortgage
reduction and inflation.

Consequently, it is admitted that
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Appellant has some interest in the residence, while Respondent
has some interest in the lots.
The job of the Trial Court was to determine what that
interest should be, based upon the evidence presented to it.

A

review of the record shows a definite lack of solid evidence of
the costs of improvements claimed to have been made by
Appellant on the residence and little evidence other than the
listing prices on the value of the lots.
This being the case, the Trial Court did the only
reasonable thing possible:

It looked at the fair market value

of the home, both at the time of the marriage and at the time
of trial (Exhibit 1-P), the mortgage balances and the testimony
of the parties as to improvements and concluded that Appellant,
indeed, had an interest in the home and that that interest was
$11,500.00.

It is important to note that even though

Appellant has claimed large contributions towards improvements
in this home, he provided the Trial Court with nothing (no
checks, bank statements or receipts) which in any way document
and support his claim.

Further the Trial Court recognized the

fact that in all fairness, Respondent had a greater interest
because she brought this asset into the marriage.
The same analysis was used in the handling of the real
estate lots.

Because Appellant brought this property into the

marriage, the Court determined he would receive a greater
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interest (Appellant two-thirds and Respondent one-third) ·
Appellant claims the Trial Court shouldn't have ordered these
lots sold, but Appellant did not provide the Court with an
appraisal.

Further, given the fact that Respondent, indeed,

had acquired an interest in this property, the Trial Court had
no other choice than to require the lots to be sold in the
market place and thereby give each party his or her just
portion of the proceeds.

The considerable latitude of

discretion afforded the Trial Court in divorce actions includes
the power to require the sale of assets to effectuate an
equitable distribution of the property between the parties.
Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1977).

Appellant has

simply not shown an abuse of discretion in the way the home and
lots were disposed of by the Trial Court.

Accordingly, its

decision should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's award of alimony was not unfair given
the length of the marriage, the contribution of each of the
parties and their respective earning capabilities.

Simply

because Respondent uses a portion of the alimony award to pay
the second mortgage, does not entitle Appellant to any
reimbursement of the alimony he is required to pay.

The

property distribution giving Respondent a larger interest in
the home she brought into the marriage, and the Appellant a
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larger interest in the lots he brought into the marriage was
most fair.

Appellant has failed to show any abuse of

discretion or manifest injustice on the part of the Trial Court
in either the support award or the property distribution.
Respectfully submitted this

/Z

day of March, 1982.
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